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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines the impact of governance mechanisms on firm’s operating 
performance in the light of recent institutional reform in corporate governance (CG) guidelines 
in the context of an emerging economy, Bangladesh, over pre- (2007-2011) and post-reform 
(2013-2017) stages. Particular attentions are paid to discussing the effect of board size, board 
independence and CEO duality. It employs generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation 
technique to control for the possible endogeneity issues in governance-performance nexus. The 
results reveal that board size made a significant positive contribution in enhancing firm 
performance during the post-reform phase, while no significant association was found in the 
pre-reform stage. After the reform, the negative significance of both the CEO duality and board 
independence fade away, even, the negative impact of including outsiders in boardroom 
changed to an insignificant positive association. Our findings suggest that although the reform 
with increased proportion of independent directors establishes boards’ resource provisioning 
role, it is yet to demonstrate the full-fledged monitoring contribution that improves firm 
performance. 
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